Asymmetric Federalism: Revisiting Centre–State Relations in India
Author(s): Dr. Kyasaram Kishtaiah
Publication #: 2609027
Date of Publication: 06.02.2025
Country: India
Pages: 1-13
Published In: Volume 11 Issue 1 February-2025
DOI: https://doi.org/10.62970/IJIRCT.v11.i1.2609027
Abstract
India’s federal design has never been uniform. From the special constitutional provisions for Jammu and Kashmir and the north-eastern states to regional safeguards such as those for Kalyana-Karnataka, and from “special category” status in fiscal transfers to the distinct governance model of Delhi, asymmetry has served as a deliberate instrument of nation-building rather than an accident of political bargaining. This paper revisits Centre–State relations in India through the lens of asymmetric federalism and asks how far differentiated arrangements still accommodate diversity, and how far recent centralising trends erode them. Drawing on constitutional texts, Supreme Court jurisprudence, the reports of the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions, and Finance Commission data, it examines three dimensions of asymmetry: constitutional-territorial, political-administrative and fiscal. The paper argues that India is drifting from negotiated, accommodative asymmetry towards hierarchical asymmetry determined by the Union, a shift visible in the 2019 reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir, the contest over Delhi’s governance, the goods and services tax regime and the north–south debate on devolution. Comparison with Canada, Spain, Belgium and Malaysia suggests that durable asymmetry rests on consent, institutional guarantees and predictable fiscal rules. The paper closes with reform proposals for strengthening intergovernmental institutions and safeguarding the federal balance.
Keywords: Asymmetric federalism; Centre–State relations; Article 370; Article 371; fiscal federalism; Finance Commission; cooperative federalism; India
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